When Anti-Corruption Agencies Delegitimate the State: The Case of Nepal and Guatemala

State-led anti-corruption agencies are often posited for their state-legitimizing effects. This article argues that anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) can have adverse legitimacy effects on the state and its institutions. Based on an extensive review of the literature the paper first defines twelve ACA ideal types which reflect their corruption-reduction potential. Negative effects of ACAs on state legitimacy are illustrated through two case studies, Nepal and Guatemala. The findings show that ACAs can negatively impact state legitimacy if they increase citizens’ awareness and condemnation of corruption in state institutions or if governments interfere with effective investigations from the ACA. Taken together, these findings highlight that anti-corruption policies and reforms need to account for and adapt to potentially delegitimating effects on state institutions.

Keywords:
Anti-corruption agency; state legitimacy; trust; Guatemala; Nepal